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The author attempts to identify and measure determinants of sovereign credit ratings for 
emerging markets as rated by the three leading ratings agencies, namely:- Fitch, Moody's, and 
Standard and Poor's. Sovereign credit ratings have a vital role in capital mobilisation and 
portfolio inflows as they dictate the cost and eligibility of borrowing in the global capital 
markets. The sovereign credit ratings also act as a ceiling for sub-sovereign borrowers’ 
foreign currency ratings, and as suggested by available literature and empirics, sub-sovereigns 
can never be rated above their sovereign.  
 
Emerging markets now account for 40 percent of the world GDP, up from around 20 percent 
two decades ago. However, despite the strong foreign investment inflows to emerging 
markets, according to Standard and Poor’s 2016 report, 9 of the top 20 emerging market 
sovereigns had negative outlook on their credit ratings, thus indicating a possible downgrade 
over the next two years.  
 
Since 2010, South Africa’s sovereign foreign currency ratings have generally been stable to 
negative, with some downgrades in 2013 and 2015. For the past decade, South Africa has 
moved from BBB+ to BBB- as at end of 2016. Drawing on the literature, the analysis shows a 
formalised relationship between certain economic variables and the sovereign credit ratings. 
Economic variables like economic growth, exchange rate and the country’s external balance 
of payments have a positive impact on credit ratings, whilst a negative relationship exists 
between sovereign ratings and variables like inflation and external debt. Based on these 
findings, a case can be made in assisting emerging and developing countries to obtain and or 
achieve investment grade credit ratings, not just for central government borrowing, but for 
local and other sub-sovereign entities' access to international capital markets. Improved 
ratings can also be useful for securitization and in leveraging official aid and improved 
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1.1 Background of the study research area 
Globally, credit ratings date back to the 1850s, when the United States (US) railroad 
companies in their quest to expand into the “wild west” became part of a large bonded debt 
market to fund their expansion (Grier & Katz, 1976). Due to a massive wave of corporate 
activity in the railroad business, European investors started demanding third party and 
independent credit information for the US companies they invested in (Katz, 1974). With 
what started off as simple credit reporting, later became the publication of statistics and 
specialized financial data. The credit ratings have greatly evolved to being the focused 
opinions of credit worthiness that we have today, and a key element in modern financial 
markets.   
 
In 2010, the number of credit ratings agencies had grown to over 70 (IMF, 2010). However, 
credit rating is still a highly concentrated industry, and to this day the global market is 
dominated by the “big three”, controlling a total 95 percent of the industry, namely Fitch 
Ratings (Fitch), Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings (S&P) and Moody’s Investor Services 
(Moody’s). The highly concentrated market structure is attributed to the historical reputation 
built upon by these three agencies over a long period of time, hence creating a high entry 
barrier for new entrants (Chen, 2016). According to these credit rating agencies, their aim is 
to provide the investing public an independent assessment and opinion of relative credit risk 
for specific debt instruments, including credit quality of governments and their debt issues 
(S&P, 2011).  
 
Most investors, including institutional and private equity, have often relied upon these credit 
ratings on their assessment of credit worthiness of borrowing countries. Credit quality has a 
bearing on the cost of borrowing. Apart from credit assessment and cost, today sovereign 
credit ratings also act as a moral suasion for governments to apply prudent and robust 
economic policies to achieve and maintain good ratings. Sovereign credit ratings have a 
subsequent and direct impact on credit ratings assigned to individual borrowers within the 
boundaries of their respective countries. Thus credit rating agencies rarely assign better or 
higher ratings to private companies or government institutions above that of the sovereign 




Over the years, the sovereign credit ratings assigned to advanced economies, emerging 
markets and developing countries have charted different paths. Years of socio-political 
reforms and strengthened macroeconomic fundamentals have improved the sovereign credit 
ratings of most emerging market economies (Borio and Parker, 2004). During the 2007/8 
global financial crisis and the subsequent euro debt crisis, the average of the foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings of 28 advanced economies as assigned by the three leading credit 
ratings agencies deteriorated by two full rating notches from AA+ to AA-, while the average 
of the similar ratings assigned to 68 emerging market countries were mostly stable (Amstad 
and Parker, 2015). 
 









Overall AE 28 AA+ AA- -2.1 
EME 69 BBB- BB+ -0.2 
Asia-Pacific AE 5 AA+ AA+ -0.2 
EME 12 BBB- BBB 0.6 
Americas AE 2 AAA AAA -0.2 
EME 20 BB BB 0.2 
Europe AE 20 AA+ A+ -2.9 
EME 20 BBB BBB- -0.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa EME 8 BB BB -0.3 
Middle East and North Africa AE 1 A- A+ 1.3 
EME 9 BBB+ BBB -0.5 
 
1 A notch is the difference between ratings grades, AAA and AA+, A- and BBB+ 
 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review 
 
The post financial crisis era has seen most advanced economies bear the brunt of a sovereign 
credit ratings decline. As shown in Table 1 above, Europe recorded the highest downgrades 
for both advanced and emerging market economies between 2007 and 2015. Emerging 
markets in the Sub-Saharan, Middle East and North Africa had modest ratings adjustments, 
which were largely attributed to developments in the fiscal and macroeconomic 
environments. Some of the changes in the credit ratings have been driven by the evolving 




2015). The rating agencies have moved to a more quantitative input-approach compared to 
prior years. 
 
In South Africa, the first sovereign credit ratings were issued in 1994 by Fitch, soon after 
attaining its independence from the apartheid government. The new government had to 
immediately raise funds to address the socio-economic consequences of apartheid. That sort 
of funding was not domestically available; it required the deeper pockets of the international 
capital markets, and that year South Africa was issued a “BB” non-investment grade rating by 
Fitch, with S&P and Moody’s following suite later on the same year (Fitch, 2010).     
 
Almost two decades after South Africa’s first assigned sovereign ratings and its subsequent 
strides in improving them, in 2015 South Africa was downgraded by Fitch to the lowest 
investment grade BBB- (SARB, 2015). S&P maintained the same investment grade cut-off 
throughout the year (S&P, 2015). Since then, South Africa has been grappling with retaining 
its investment grade ratings status. However in 2016, even though S&P maintained its credit 
ratings for Africa’s most industrialized economy to BBB-, it changed its ratings outlook to 
negative.    
   
For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
assigned to an emerging economy, using South Africa as a case study. The study also 
suggests, with great significance, that ratings assigned by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P can be 
explained by a small string of well-defined factors. These factors have been weighed equally 
consistent by the three leading rating agencies over time, and account for the lion’s share of 
ratings differentials between countries. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Previous studies have shown that sovereign credit ratings capture and reflect the shifts in the 
macroeconomic fundamentals (Poon, 2003; Mora, 2006; Ratha et al, 2007). These 
quantitative factors, thus economic growth, inflation, level of economic development and 
government debt can provide a strong position on a country’s willingness and ability to meet 






For a long time most emerging markets, especially in Africa have failed to achieve investment 
grade ratings, provided they have managed to get ratings in the first place. The negative 
impact of poor quality credit ratings has been felt then, and is still being felt now. The vast of 
these countries on the continent and beyond are falling short in accessing cheaper and or 
affordable funding for development. To the few well rated, credit ratings keep deteriorating. 
As of 2015, only 4 emerging market countries in Africa had an investment grade rating (S&P, 
2015; Moody’s, 2015; Fitch, 2015).  
 
South Africa, as one of the few investment-grade rated emerging countries in Africa, has not 
been spared from the implications of sovereign risk and bad credit ratings.   As South Africa’s 
sovereign credit ratings continue to decline and or trade on negative outlook, there is an 
urgent need for a more prudent policy framework which will build business confidence in the 
country. 
   
The decline in SA’s sovereign credit ratings since late 2012 and early 2013, have triggered a 
rise in real bond yields and a general increase in the government’s interest expense as a 
percentage of its total debt. During the 12 months to September 2015, the SA government 
debt servicing bill increased to R131 billion (StatsSA, 2015), which led to the introduction of 
new taxes like sugar tax as a funding mechanism, and the introduction of expenditure cuts in 
other areas.  
 
Also with rising bond yields, there is accompanying inflationary pressure in the economy; and 
an increase in inflation have a corresponding push in nominal bond yields.  With changes in 
debt ratios, the government may be pushed to borrow more to fund its runaway expenditure, 
and with such a bad fiscal norm, a further credit rating downgrade may be looming. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and hypothesis 
The objective of the research is to establish the significance of each of the determinants of 
sovereign credit ratings assigned by the three leading credit rating agencies as established by 
their global risk architecture in an emerging market economy.  
 
Most of the studies on sovereign credit ratings have only tested the immediate ephemeral 




determinant factors on the credit ratings themselves. In order to close that knowledge gap, the 
study systematically tests three hypotheses;  
 
Hypothesis 1 – Long term economic prospects (economic growth and development). 
According to Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006), a high and stable growth rate decreases relative 
debt burden, hence long term economic growth and development should positively impact 
sovereign credit ratings. The study therefore hypothesizes that; 
HO: economic prospects do not have a statistically significant impact on sovereign 
credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies.  
HA: economic prospects have a statistically significant impact on sovereign credit 
ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies.  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Stability and flexibility of fiscal and monetary policies. 
Fiscal and monetary policies encapsulate the level of government spending flexibility, which 
has a bearing on the potential to mobilise revenue and in turn service debt, (Cantor and 
Parker, 1996). The study therefore hypothesizes that; 
HO: Inflation, fiscal balance and the real exchange rate do not have a statistically 
significant impact on sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies.  
HA: Inflation, fiscal balance and the real exchange rate have a statistically significant 
impact on sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies.  
 
Hypothesis 3 – Long term external debt, current account surplus and credit ratings 
history. 
External debt is viewed as a source of instability and may ultimately increase credit risk, thus 
the probability of default, (Mulder and Perrelli, 2001). Also, according to Cantor and Parker 
(1996), ratings quality is first determined by any previous and current credit defaults. The 
study therefore hypothesizes that; 
HO: External debt, current account surplus and credit ratings history do not have a 





HA: External debt, current account surplus and credit ratings history have a 
statistically significant impact on sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit 
rating agencies.  
1.4 Justification of the Research  
Most studies on the impact and determinants of sovereign credit ratings have largely focused 
on developed and advanced economies (Canter and Parker, 1996; Poon, 2003; Mora, 2006; 
Rath, De and Mohapathra, 2007). Although still very limited, there are some studies which 
have covered emerging markets in general (Ozmen and Sahinbeyoglu, 2009; Cavallo et al, 
2004), but a focus on emerging African countries has largely been ignored. Also, the extent of 
impact of these well-defined determinants of sovereign credit ratings on a country’s assigned 
ratings has scarcely been studied.  
 
Some studies have argued that quantitative factors alone, may not present a complete and 
comprehensive picture on the probable drivers of a country’s sovereign credit risk (Gaillard, 
2009), but qualitative aspects like policy consistency, transparency and the establishment of 
independent institutional structures also impact on sovereign’s credit ratings. This study looks 
at the framework commonly used by the three main credit ratings agencies – Fitch, S&P and 
Moody’s, which control a combined 95 percent of the credit ratings market, to assess eight 
economic variables and the impact they have on sovereign credit ratings in an emerging 
economy. 
 
The study seeks to address the knowledge gap on what determines a negative or positive 
rating from a set of macroeconomic factors, and also identify the variables that have more 
weight in the determination of sovereign credit ratings as assigned by the three leading rating 
agencies.  
 
South Africa, as one of the emerging economies, was used as a case due to the availability 
and easy access to information. The study has a potential to assist policy makers throughout 
the region to work on certain economic fundamentals in order to improve their ratings, which 
will better securitize their markets and help leverage official aid by improving their respective 







1.5 Scope of the study 
The scope of the research was limited to the determinants of ‘long term foreign currency’ 
sovereign credit ratings in emerging markets. The difference between local and foreign 
currency sovereign credit ratings is mainly driven by transfer risk, hence foreign currency 
ratings are typically lower that domestic or local currency ratings. A sample of annual data 
covering the period 1994 to 2016 was used to analyse a set of macro-economic factors and the 
impact they have had on South Africa’s long term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings. 
 
The data analysis was modelled from the studies carried by Cantor and Parker (1996), Mellios 
and Paget-Blanc (2006) and Mora-Jensen (2013) to test six of South Africa’s economic 
variables against sovereign credit ratings. The analysis was conducted using an ARDL model 
of a time series nature. 
 
 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
The study is organised into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the background, thus 
emergency and growth of the sovereign credit ratings industry, its size and market structure. 
The objective and scope of the study, and gaps in existing literature and empirics is also 
outlined in chapter one. Chapter two details the existing literature and theoretical framework 
on the definition, rating scales and determinants of sovereign credit ratings. The chapter 
further explores related studies done by other researchers on the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings. Chapter three defines the analytical framework for the determinants of 
sovereign credit ratings and quantitative modelling tools used in relation to the empirical 
analysis. Chapter four documents the results of the empirical analysis, and chapter five 
concludes with a summary of the key findings and major contributions of the study, also with 








2.1 Introduction  
In this review, the global history of sovereign credit ratings, with reference to the three 
founding and leading global rating agencies and their current relevance is introduced. Also a 
section of the credit ratings history of South Africa is explored. This further leads to an 
exploration of definitions of sovereign credit ratings, ratings scales and related drivers. 
Relevant existing literature and empirical work on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
is examined and discussed.   
 
2.2 Sovereign credit ratings history  
Sovereign credit ratings predate the World War 1 era, when the United States was issued the 
first long term rating by Moody’s, driven by a sudden growth in the US capital markets 
(Levey, 2002).  By 1929, 21 national governments had been rated by S&P, mostly from 
Europe and South America. Only the US and Argentina had an “A” grade, China a “B” and 
most European and South American countries were in the speculative grade (S&P, 2007). 
There wasn’t much activity outside the industrialized countries until the birth of emerging 
economies as a source of growth in the 1990s, which became heavily involved in converting 
bank loans and issuing debt on the international capital markets to fund their growth (Cantor 
and Parker, 1996).  
 
South Africa’s sovereign credit ratings date as far back as 1994, when Fitch Ratings first 
issued the country’s first sovereign ratings soon after independence. The country’s sovereign 
credit ratings as issued by the three leading ratings agencies generally remained stable from 
1994 to 2000 as speculative non-investment grade. In 2001, Fitch and S&P upgraded South 
Africa’s sovereign ratings to match Moody’s on a lower investment grade status. The 
country’s ratings kept improving up until 2013, and to this date, since then, South Africa has 
been experiencing deteriorating quality of its ratings.   
 
Figure 1 and 2 show South Africa’s sovereign credit ratings history for ratings issued by Fitch 






Figure 1: South Africa’s sovereign credit ratings history since 1994 
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Figure 2: South Africa’s sovereign credit ratings history since 1994 
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2.3 Definition and measurements of sovereign credit ratings 
Sovereign credit ratings as defined by Cantor and Parker are assessments of the relative 
likelihood of a borrower defaulting on its obligations. Hooper et al (2008) go on further to 
state that sovereign credit ratings are opinions by credit rating agencies, on the ability and 
willingness of sovereign governments in meeting their financial commitments in full and on 
time as per the initial agreement.  Once a national government has been rated, most studies 
have revealed that corporations or their respective financial instruments may not be issued 
with ratings above or better than that assigned to its country of domicile (Brooks et al, 2004; 




According to S&P Global (2016), sovereign credit ratings are forward looking opinions about 
a sovereign with respect to the overall country’s creditworthiness. These opinions reflect the 
rating agencies’ view of the country’s ability and willingness to meet its financial 
commitments as they become due. Credit ratings are defined by Moody’s as simple grades by 
which future relative creditworthiness of sovereigns, institutions and securities are gauged. 
Since John Moody devised the first bond rating definitions in 1909, Moody’s ratings have 
expanded to 32 grades, with the number growing by the years in response to increasing depth 
and breadth of the global capital markets (See figure 3).    
 
Figure 3: Rating system outstanding by decade 
 
Source: Moody’s Investor Services 
 
Moody’s, Fitch and S&P assign and publish two kinds of sovereign credit ratings, and these 
are long term and short term obligation ratings. These obligations are further analyzed 
separately for both local and foreign currency. These rating agencies also provide auxiliary 
signals about credit risk through the use of rating outlooks and watchlist designations 
(Moody’s, 2007)  
 
Credit ratings are generally classified into two broad categories, investment grade and non-
investment grade, also known as speculative grade or “junk” status. S&P and Fitch ratings 
usually aim at measuring the likelihood of default (S&P, 2007; Fitch 2010), and unlike 













recovery value or the expected default position. Moody’s focuses beyond default probability, 
by taking into account what is likely to occur if and when an issuer goes into default.  
 
S&P and Fitch use a risk grading scale slightly different to Moody’s. The two agencies use 
ordinal scales ranging from AAA, signaling extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
obligations, to D, where an issuer has defaulted on one or more of its obligations, for long 
term ratings (S&P, 2010; Fitch 2011). Plus (+) or minus (-) signs are also used between rating 
categories AAA to CCC as modifiers of relative status within those categories (Gaillard, 
2009).  
 
Table 2 below shows long term sovereign credit rating scales from all three leading rating 
agencies.  
  
Table 2: Agency long term sovereign credit rating scales 
S&P Fitch Moody’s Rating description Corresponding numbers 


















































































Extremely speculative 1 
















Moody’s highest long term issuer credit ratings start from Aaa, regarded as extremely strong 
capacity to repay debt, to the lowest speculative grade C (Moody’s, 2007). Moody’s long 
term ratings are further enriched through modifiers 1, 2 and 3 for ratings between Aa to Caa 
to enhance relative ranking within those categories (Moody’s, 2007; Gaillard, 2009). 
Although the three agencies use different ratings symbols, the correspondence that exists 
between these ratings allows for the transformation of rating notches to numbers. 
 
2.4 Determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
The existing theoretical framework on sovereign credit ratings is driven primarily by 
sovereign debt and default (Eaton and Gersonvitz, 1981).  Sovereign credit ratings address 
two aspects in debt settlement, thus ability and willingness. Ability, which is the first 
theoretical aspect described by Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006) as the debt servicing capacity 
approach, is the unintended deterioration of the sovereign’s capacity to service debt which 
could ultimately lead to its default. According to Haque et al (1996)’s theoretical approach, 
the sustainability of debt determines the probability of default, and sustainability may be 
driven by macroeconomic factors, economic policy, currency crises, short term budget 
mismanagement and internal or external shock. Emerging market countries like Brazil, 
Russia, South Korea and Turkey, which experienced sovereign crises in recent years illustrate 
debt servicing difficulties spanning from the countries’ rescheduling of their sovereign debts 
to outright defaults (Mellios and Paget-Blanc, 2006).  
 
Willingness to pay debt on the other hand is incentivized primarily by the need to maintain a 
good reputation and preserving future access to capital markets (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). 
A model developed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) reflects the threat of future sanction should 
a country fail on its debt commitment, restructure or default. The choice should be ultimately 
made by the borrowing country on the costs and benefits of restructuring, rescheduling or 
defaulting. Thus, the probability of default becomes an increasing function of variables 
inciting a country to default; and a decreasing function of variables raising the cost of default 
Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006).  
 
According to economic theory, variables that increase the probability of default are the level 
of economic growth and development, general increase in price level of goods and services 




history. These economic variables are common on both willingness and ability of a country to 
service its debt on time and in full. 
  
Moody’s (2011) rating methodology measures capacity to settle debt based on economic 
strength and susceptibility to event risk, and its willingness based on the strength of its 
institution. S&P focuses on 5 key areas which speak to two economic profiles, institutional 
and governance effectiveness, and flexibility and performance, (Karaaslan & Özden, 2016) 
(see Figure 4 below). Other agencies’ sovereign rating methodologies group risk variables 
into 6 quantitative and qualitative factors, namely, fiscal management and policy, debt and 
liquidity, economic structure and performance, monetary policy and financial stability, 
balance of payments and political environment (DBRS, 2016).     
 
Figure 4: S&P Sovereign crediting rating framework 
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In their study, Cantor and Packer (1996) used eight macroeconomic factors to test their 
impact on sovereign credit ratings for 49 advanced and developing countries. They used the 
1995 data to run a regression analysis of the average of Moody’s and S&P ratings against 
economic development, economic growth, inflation, external debt, and an indicator for default 
history as independent variables that determine sovereign credit ratings.  Their results show 
that a set of 8 macroeconomic variables chosen explain 90 percent in sample variation of 
sovereign credit ratings as assigned by Moody’s and S&P. However, Cantor and Parker 
(1996) fail to address the impact of these macroeconomic variables on individual countries or 
group of countries of the same economic structure.   
 
Juttner and McCarthy (2000) replicated Cantor and Parker’s model for the period 1996 to 
1998. Their study noted that the findings by Cantor and Parker (1996) had less explanatory 
power during the 1997 financial crisis experienced by emerging market countries like Brazil, 
Russia and Thailand. They concluded that the relationship between ratings and economic 
variables is not stable over time.  The study was further replicated by Monfort and Mulder 
(2000), using 1994 to 1999 sample data from 20 emerging market countries. Their study 
covered the 1997 Asian economic crisis, and their results confirmed the findings of Juttner 
and McCarthy, noting the autocorrelation displayed by estimates. The study finally suggested 
that sovereign ratings reflect a high degree of inertia and appears to follow only unexpected 
developments in variables.  
 
However, in Mulder and Perrelli (2001) study of 25 developing and emerging market 
countries for the period 1992 to 1999, the results show that 6 static economic variables, 
similar to those in Cantor and Parker’s study, explained a large part of ratings variations. 
Their major contribution to other previous studies was that the key variable which explains 
ratings was investment to GDP ratio which speaks to the country’s liquidity profile, as 
opposed to economic growth and inflation.   
 
McKenzie (2002), unlike most studies which focused on the variables that seem relevant to 
explain the variables’ impact on sovereign credit ratings, he chose an alternative approach of 
using a principal component analysis (PCA), to identify variables that affect sovereigns’ 
default. His study identified twelve variables from a data set of 46 factors that were common 
in countries which defaulted to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 




the most common twelve factors leading to the defaults were GDP growth, inflation, 
economic development, current account, foreign debt to GDP, real exchange rate, default 
history, debt to GDP ratio, reserves to imports ratio, investment to GDP ratio and the 
corruption index.   
 
Similar tests were done by Afonso (2003) and MacFadden et al (2005) using 2001 data, and 
showed that economic growth and development was the major driver of sovereign ratings in 
advanced economics whilst external debt had a huge impact for emerging markets and 
developing economies.    
 
Another benchmark model of determinants of sovereign ratings was conducted by Borio and 
Parker (2004), by introducing controls of other factors affecting country risk in order to 
identify what debt intolerance, original sin and currency mismatch contribute to credit quality. 
They obtained an adjusted R-squared of 0.9 with seven controlled economic variables 
covering a period of 1996 to 2003. Their conclusions were, debt intolerance is worse where a 
country has a history of mismanaging the economy, and original sin, which implies that a 
country with less ability to borrow in their own currency has a higher inherent risk, leading to 
poor ratings. Also, according to Borio and Parker (2004), countries with national income and 
growth which is more sensitive to exchange rate depreciation are most likely to suffer severe 
ratings downgrades in the event of a shock.   
 
A number of empirical studies have examined the impact of macroeconomic factors on 
sovereign ratings (Cantor and Parker, 1996; Juttner and McCarthy, 2000; Mulder and Perrelli, 
2001 and Afonso, 2003). In all these studies the selection on independent variables has 
largely been driven by the rating agencies’ methodology and by theoretical drivers of 
sovereign default (Mellios and Paget-Blanc, 2006). 
 
Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006), using PCA, following the study by McKenzie (2002), 
suggested an additional factor: - regulatory quality, accountability, rule of law and political 
stability, which captures the country’s willingness to pay debt. Their analysis covers 2003 
ratings of 86 countries and 49 economic and political factors for the year 2002. They then 
assessed the effects of the 13 variables on ratings through a linear regression and an ordered 
logistic model. Their findings were also consistent with other researchers like Cantor and 




history are variables with high impact and most significant to variations in sovereign credit 
ratings. The two also argued that the logistic model have better results compared to those 
provided by the OLS regression model.  
 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al (2006), through their ordered-probit and scenario-based 
approach, have further re-affirmed Cantor and Parker’s findings, by adding a technological 
advancement proxy, and observing its significance, together with economic growth and 
inflation, as major determinants of sovereign credit ratings.  Gaillard (2009) argues that in as 
much as quantitative macroeconomic factors significantly determine sovereign credit ratings; 
there are also other qualitative factors which are highly impactful. Gaillard mentioned a very 
important facet in today’s operational environment: the political-economy factor, and further 
argued that the rating agencies also factor-in their own perceived judgements with regards to 
the political environment when conducting the sovereign ratings process.    
 
Another study carried out by Gultekin-Karakas et al (2011), found that, holding 
macroeconomic factors constant, high income countries are more likely to get higher ratings 
compared to low income countries. However, the authors were criticised for ignoring default 
history and the degree of institutional strength. Bartels and Weder di Mauro (2013) also noted 
that Moody’s and S&P rate emerging market countries lower than does Feri, a European 
based rating agency; suggesting the existence of some form of herding behaviour in ratings 
changes or adjustments.   
 
According to Kiff et al (2012), various credit rating agencies ordinarily limit their time 
horizon to between 2 to 3 years, and their assigned ratings are said to reflect creditworthiness 
within that period. Their study concluded that perceived vulnerability to periodic downturns 
within the ratings period, but not the current state, determines to a greater extent, the 
variability of sovereign ratings.  Dembiermont et al (2015), in their study of general 
government debt, suggested that complications in government debt as measured by public 
debt stocks in subnational authorities and state-owned institution has heavy implications on 
sovereign credit ratings. They alluded their evidence to some emerging market economies 






Following Amstad and Parker (2015), at least 4 risk factors have gained ground in ratings 
methodology over the years, whilst one has fallen out. According to their theory, monetary 
policy regimes have come into sharper focus, together with currency internationalization, 
contingent liabilities due to event risk and financial cycles, as the main driving forces behind 
sovereign ratings shifts. The two postulate that positive economic indicators like per capita 
GDP is now of less emphasis than the growth performance and potential, as well as outlook. 
  
In conclusion, the existing theoretical literature and empirical evidence indicate that a number 
of economic factors determine sovereign credit ratings, as initially identified by Cantor and 
Parker (1996), and later validations by Juttner and McCarthy (2000), Afonso (2003), and 
MacFadden et al (2005). Also some publications drawn upon Fitch Ratings (Fitch, 2010), 
Moody’s Investor Services (Moody’s, 2007) and S&P Global Ratings (S&P, 2007) indicate 
that the agencies’ own judgements and opinions play a role in determining ratings. A 
qualitative opinion on a developed country’s ability to service its debt can never be the same 
as that given to developing country, hence most of these studies ignore that very important 
factor by combining developed and developing countries under one study. According to 
Cantor and Parker (1996), 6 economic factors: per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, 
external debt, level of economic development and default history, explain 92 percent of the 
variability in Moody’s and S&P’s average sovereign credit ratings, suggesting the 







3.1 Introduction  
The chapter provides the basis for the chosen empirical analysis. It defines the research design 
and data sources to be used in the study. The chapter further defines key terms and describes 
variables which form part of the analytical framework for the determinants of sovereign credit 
ratings and the quantitative modelling tools used in relation to the empirical analysis and 
testing.   
 
3.2 Research design and data sources 
The research will employ secondary data as the principal approach through theoretical and 
empirical analysis. The secondary data set will cover 23 years of which long term sovereign 
credit ratings were issued to South Africa by all three leading rating agencies:- Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch, covering the period 1994 to 2016. South Africa has been chosen as it is a classic 
representative of both, an emerging market and a developing economy, due to the close 
resemblance of its political economy to that of the rest of Africa, and its financial economy to 
that of the emerging markets. Also the availability and easy access of reliable data has made 
South Africa an ideal sample of the market under study.     
 
3.3 Regression Model  
One dependent variable and six independent explanatory variables are described and the 
measures that represent these variables in the study are identified for quantitative analysis. 
Also, the relationship between each independent variable and the impact on the country’s 
willingness and ability to service its debt is explained.  
 
The mathematical equation for examining the determinants of sovereign credit ratings in 
South Africa is adapted from the studies by Cantor and Parker (1996), Afonso (2002) and 
Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006).         
 






The definition and measurement of the variables are discussed below;  
 
Sovereign credit ratings: the average of the ratings assigned that year by Fitch, Moody’s and 
S&P quantified through linear transformation. As used in Cantor and Parker (1996), and also 
as assigned by the major credit rating agencies, each rating will assume values of 1 to 24 as 
follows; C/D/D = 1, C/SD/DD/ = 2, .., and Aaa/AAA/AAA = 24. SA’s average rating for a 
particular year will be the mean of the three numerical values representing Moody’s, Fitch 
and S&P as applied in Moon and Stotsky (1993), Cantor and Parker (1996) and Afonso 
(2002).         
 
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth: a measure of economic growth, which is the annual 
real GDP growth on a year on year basis, measured as a percentage. A high growth rate 
decreases the relative debt burden, and lightens insolvency problems (Mellios and Paget-
Blanc, 2006). Also an increasing rate of economic growth entails easier servicing of debt over 
time (Cantor and Packer, 1996). A weaker GDP growth weakens public finances and 
ultimately institutional strength and funds available to service debt (Moody’s, 2007).  
 
External debt service: that is the percentage of foreign currency debt service relative to 
exports. There is a positive relationship between debt burden and risk of default. When 
exports decrease, the foreign currency debt position worsens, hence the country’s likelihood 
to default. 
 
Real exchange rate: measured against the dollar position. As the yearly average real 
exchange rate depreciates, so is the risk of default in servicing foreign currency debt.  
 
Inflation: is the percentage rate of the annual consumer price index, which indicates the 
structural position of the government’s finances and policies. Also a proxy of policy 
consistency and stability, in the event a government is struggling to meet its financial 
obligations, what sort of measures will it take, and in what direction will be captured by the 
CPI.  
 
External balance: measured as a percentage of the average annual current account surplus 
relative to GDP, which also measures the level of reliability to external remittances. A huge 




Fiscal balance: measured as a percentage of average annual national government budget 
surplus to GDP, hence a huge surplus indicates greater ability to service and meet current 
obligations without crowding out private investments and domestic savings. 
 
Default History: measures credit reputation by using an indicator variable to note whether 
South Africa defaulted on any of its debts on that year. Default history is key and has been 
evident on both theoretical and empirical evidence that creditors often consider in their 
consideration and pricing decision (Eaton, 1996; Cantor and Parker, 1996 and Ozler, 1991).  
 
Table 3: Independent variables and their expected signs 
Independent variable Variable Symbol Unit of 
measurement 
Sovereign credit rating 
Gross domestic product  GDP % Positive (+) 
External debt EDebt % Negative (-) 
Real exchange rate RExR Numeric Positive (+) 
Inflation Infl % Negative (-) 
External balance EBal % Positive (+) 
Fiscal balance FiscBal % Positive (+) 
 
 3.4 Analytical framework  
In data analysis, several studies have determined sovereign credit ratings as quantitative 
dependent variables, using linear and classic regression models and time series analysis 
(Cantor and Parker, 1996; Mora, 2006; Ratha et al, 2011, while other studies have determined 
the ratings as qualitative dependent variables, thereby using binary choice models (Mora, 
2006 and Gaillard, 2009). 
 
3.4.1 Unit root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) 
The study falls within the time series framework. To avoid a spurious regression, since the 
OLS relies on the stochastic process being stationary, a unit root test was conducted prior to 
running any regression model. Also non-stationary variables in OLS models invalidates the 
hypothesis tests about the regression parameters, hence a unit root test can be a way to select 





The objective of the unit root test by Dickey and Fuller (1984) tests is to test the null 
hypothesis that ρ = 1, in variables like; 
∆Inflt = ρInflt-1 + (constant/time trend) + µt   
 against the one-sided H1 ρ< 1. Thus, we have; 
 H0: series contains a unit root,  
 H1: series is stationary 
 
The stationarity or non-stationarity of a series can strongly influence the series’ behaviour and 
properties, and also a high R2 could result from two variables trending against each other even 
though the two are entirely unrelated.  
 
3.4.2 Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model  
In this study, an ARDL model is employed on six explanatory variables to analyze and 
measure their significance and impact on long term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings.  
 
ΔRatingst = β0 + Σ β1ΔRatingst-i + Σγ2ΔInflt-j + Σγ3ΔEDebtt-j + Σγ4ΔEBalt-j + Σγ5ΔGDPt-j + 
Σγ6ΔRExRt-j + Σγ7ΔFiscBalt-j + θ0Ratingst-1 + θ1Inflt-1 + θ2EDebtt-1 + θ3EBalt-1 + θ4GDPt-1 + 
θ5RExRt-1 + θ6FiscBalt-1 + εt ……………………………………………..…. 2 
 
The ARDL model has been used for decades to model the relationship between economic 
variables in single equation time series. It is useful when there is cointegration of non-
stationary variables, as the model has a reparameterization in Error Correction form (Engle 
and Granger, 1987; Hassler and Wolters, 2006).  The bounds test is further used to draw 
conclusive inference whether variables are integrated of zero I (0) or one I (1). The model 
which is a standard least squares regression, include lags of both the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables as regressors (Greene, 2008). 
 
The methodology follows that of Mora (2006), but excludes economic development, which in 
the previous study, a variable indicator of 1 and 0 was used as a classification of whether a 
country is industrialized or not. Also the researcher is of the view that the level of economic 
development and income is already captured by GDP. The study introduces the real exchange 




impact on SA’s ability to service its long term foreign exchange debt and its continuance in 
accessing low cost capital on the international markets.  
 
3.4.3 ARDL cointegration (Bounds Test) 
Cointegration is a good way of establishing the existence of steady state equilibrium between 
variables (Pesaran et al., 2001). If the variables fail to cointegrate, there are problems of 
spurious regressions and meaningless results may be obtained. ARDL cointegration technique 
has become one of the best ways of determining the existence of a long run relationship 
between time series variables that are non-stationary, as well as finding the series’ parametric 
equation to the Error Correction Model (ECM). The equation to the ECM gives the short run 
and long run relationship of the underlying variables (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). 
 
The long run relationship of variables is estimated through the F-statistic. The long run 
relationship is said to be existent when the F-statistic is greater than the critical values. This 
method has an advantage of identifying the cointegrating vectors should a multiple of them 
exist.  
 
ΔRatingst = β0 +∑  
𝑝
𝑖=0  β1ΔRatingst-i + ∑  
𝑞
𝑖=0 γ2ΔInflt-j + ∑  
𝑞
𝑖=0 γ3ΔEDebtt-j + ∑  
𝑞
𝑖=0 γ4ΔEBalt-j + 
∑  𝑞𝑖=0 γ5ΔGDPt-j + ∑  
𝑞
𝑖=0 γ6ΔRExRt-j + ∑  
𝑞
𝑖=0 γ7ΔFiscBalt-j + αECTt-1 + εt ………………3 
 
Where ECTt-1 is the error correction term.   
 
The long-run relationship between the concerned variables can be conducted based on the 
Wald test (F-statistic) by imposing restrictions on the estimated long-run coefficients of one 
period lagged level of the variables equal to zero. Then, the computed F-statistic is compared 
with the critical value tabulated in Pesaran et al. (2001). The lower bound values assume that 
the explanatory variables are integrated of order zero, or I(0), while the upper bound values 
assume that they are integrated of order one, or I(1). Therefore, if computed F-statistic falls 
below the lower bound value, I(0), the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. 
Conversely, if the computed F-statistic exceeds the upper bound value, I(1) it is concluded 
that ratings and its determinants are cointegrated and approach a long-run equilibrium. 





3.4.4 Granger causality 
Though the cointegration analysis may prove existence of a relationship between variables in 
a time series, it ignores actual causation and direction of influence (Mora-Jensen, 2013). The 
Granger (1969) approach to an equation as to whether X causes Y is to see how much of 
the current values of Y can be explained by past values of Y, and then to determine whether 
adding lagged values of X can improve the explanation. Y is said to be Granger-caused by X 
if X helps in the prediction of Y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged X’s are 
statistically significant.  
 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), if event A occurs before event B, then it is possible 
that A is causing B, but B cannot be causing A, thus events in the past can cause events to 
happen today. 
The causality test will examine whether sovereign credit ratings “causes” some of the 
macroeconomic variables like real exchange rates, inflation and external debt and or vice 
versa. 
H0: The yi do not Granger causes xi.  
H1: The xi does not Granger cause yi , where; 
 
 yi are the sovereign credit ratings 
 xi various macroeconomic variables  
 
The Granger causality test involves the following set of regressors: 
 xt = ∑ αixt-1 + ∑ βjyt-j + µ1t 
 yt = ∑ λixt-1 + ∑ δjyt-j + µ2t 










The chapter details the results of the findings. Prior to running any regression model, the Unit 
Root Test for stationarity of the variables was conducted. Also tests for cointegration and 
variable causality were run to avoid invalidating the hypothesis tests about the regression 
parameters. The default history variable was dropped in the tests as for the period under 
study; the variable has consistently been zero.   
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the variables. In terms of variability measured by 
the standard deviation, ratings have the lowest variability, whilst external debt recorded the 
highest during the period under study. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients ranging from -
0.58 to 0.82 and -1.5 to 0.92 suggest a close to normal distribution amongst the variables. It 
also shows that the distributions are mostly positive. GDP, as an exception is negatively 
skewed, which shows its impact of deteriorating ratings on economic growth.  
 
All kurtosis coefficients are less than 3, which is regarded as the acceptable level for standard 
normal distribution. All the time series distributions have sharp peaks with the exception of 
ratings and external balance, suggesting volatility in the data or the presence of outliers. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics 
  ratings edebt gdp exchange infla ebal fisc 
Mean 11.6796 9.1357 2.8696 7.6263 6.2652 -2.5130 -2.9826 
S.E 0.2587 0.6739 0.3573 0.5727 0.4410 0.4358 0.4026 
Median 11.67 8.68 3 7.263 5.9 -2.2 -3.9 
Std. Dev  1.2408 3.2319 1.7137 2.7465 2.1150 2.0901 1.9308 
Kurtosis -1.3384 0.1377 0.6851 0.9251 0.5614 -1.2066 -0.7516 
Skewness -0.1402 0.6171 -0.5811 0.8276 0.0893 -0.1769 0.4818 
Range 3.66 12.998 7.1 11.157 9.6 6.8 7.3 
Minimum 9.67 4.235 -1.5 3.549 1.4 -5.9 -6.3 
Maximum 13.33 17.233 5.6 14.706 11 0.9 1 
Sum 268.63 210.121 66 175.405 144.1 -57.8 -68.6 
Count 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 




4.3 The unit root test - Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
After running an ADF test on raw data, none of the variables were stationery at level. Five of 
the variable were integrated of order one I(1), and two of the variables integrated of order 
zero after logging, I(0) (See Appendix D). A major challenge in estimating long-run time 
series models using OLS is that variables must be stationary, that is, must be integrated of 
order zero, I(0). Should a conventional OLS regression model be applied on none I(0) time 
series variables, the regression will produce spurious results, which are meaningless or may 
lead to misleading conclusions (Brooks, 2004) 
 














Ratings 23 0 -1,933456 -3.8304 -3,0294 -2,6552 
External Debt Service  23 1 -4,276301 -3,8067 -3,0199 -2,6502 
GDP Growth % 23 1 -4,679995 -3,8067 -3,0199 -2,6506 
Real Exchange Rate to USD 23 0 -1.464266 -3,8304 -3,0294 -2,6552 
Inflation rate % 23 1 -4,491474 -3,8067 -3,0199 -2,6502 
External Balance % to GDP 23 1 -3,409363 -3,8067 -3,0199 -2,6502 
Fiscal Balance % to GDP 23 1 -3,564929 -3,8067 -3,0199 -2,6502 
Source: Author’s estimate from research data, 2017 
At critical value 1%, we reject the null hypotheses for four variables, (ratings, real exchange rate, 
external balance and fiscal balance) as the variables do not have unit roots. We fail to reject the null 
hypotheses for three variables (inflation, GDP and external debt) at all critical levels. However, at 5%, 
all variables have unit roots except for inflation and ratings.  
 
4.4 Cointegration analysis (ARDL bounds results) 
The F- statistic is used to test the hypothesis against the critical values at each leave. The 
value of the F-statistic obtained was 5.87. The critical values of the F-statistics for a different 
number of variables are available in Pesaran et al., (2001). Two sets of critical values, one 
assuming that all the variables in the ARDL model  are I(0), range from 1.92 (at 10%), 2.17 
(at 5%) to 2.73 (at 1%), marking the lower critical bound, which means that there is no 
cointegration amongst the variables. Assuming that all the variables are I(1), the critical 
values range from 2.89 (at 10%) to 3.9 (at 1%), marking the upper critical bound, meaning 
that there is cointegration among the variables. For the study, a level of 5% was chosen to test 




bounds (2.17) and the upper critical bounds (3.21), suggesting the existence of a cointegration 
relationship (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Bounds Test 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     
   
Asymptotic: 
n=1000  
F-statistic  5.874338 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s estimations from research data 2018 
 
4.5 Long run regression results 
Table 7 presents the long-run estimates. All the variables show a positive relationship with 
ratings, with the exception of exchange rate and external debt service which both reflect 
negative impact on ratings. Even though all variables are insignificant in the long run, GDP 
has the most impact, following by external balance with each unit of change in economic 
growth and external debt service resulting in 2.63 and -0.70 units of change in ratings.  
 
Table 7: Long-run estimates 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
INFLA 0.293327 0.929110 0.315708 0.7603 
GDP 2.630162 6.305652 0.417112 0.6876 
FISC 1.110096 1.496033 0.742026 0.4793 
EXCHANGE -0.064539 0.460067 -0.140281 0.8919 
EDEBT -0.704455 1.676890 -0.420096 0.6855 
EBAL 1.758754 3.058741 0.574993 0.5811 
C 10.39860 15.22336 0.683069 0.5139 
     
     
Source: Author’s estimate from research data, 2017  
The long run impact of the variables is in line with the findings of Afonso (2003) and 
MacFadden et al (2005), who suggested that in as much as economic growth and external 
debt service were the major drivers for sovereign credit rating for developing and emerging 
market countries, there are other qualitative factors like governance, policy consistency and 




the study by Gaillard (2009), who alluded to the opinions of the ratings’ agencies on policy 
direction and perceived risk as being of great significance compared to quantitative economic 
factors.  
 
In the long run economic and quantitative variables become insignificant in determining 
sovereign credit ratings as policy effectiveness, consistency and stability in the socio-political 
environment become major determinants of growth and economic performance (Haque et al, 
1996). Also in the long term, the credit ratings agencies form opinion inferences from past 
performances of the economy, including the default history, which is not captured in the 
model.  
 
4.6 Short run error correction model 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the short run error correction terms. In the short run, inflation has 
a negative impact on sovereign credit ratings. Contrary to studies by Cantor and Parker 
(1996), GDP was noted to also have a negative relationship to ratings, although the effects are 
quite insignificant as compared with the rest of the variables. Variables like fiscal balance and 
external debt servicing have a significant and positive impact on ratings as noted by a larger t-
statistic and very small p-values. Although external debt has a positive effect on ratings in the 
short run, the effects are also quite insignificant.  
 
Table 8: Short run error correction terms 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
D(INFLA) -0.150726 0.021393 -7.045674 0.0001*** 
D(GDP) -0.027774 0.029132 -0.953393 0.3683 
D(FISC) 0.229160 0.043647 5.250354 0.0008*** 
D(EDEBT) 0.016464 0.012647 1.301809 0.2292 
D(EBAL) 0.257590 0.038450 6.699349 0.0002*** 
CointEq(-1)* -0.084320 0.008200 -10.28290 0.0000*** 
 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%. Source: Author’s estimate from research data, 2017 
The negative cointEq is considered significant and has a higher t-statistic and a lower p-value. 
The cointEq has a negative coefficient of -0.084 and a p-value close to zero suggesting the 
presence of a negative long run relationship between the variables. The cointEq shows the 
rate at which the long run disequilibrium is corrected, with the general disequilibrium of 





Table 9: ARDL Summary Statistics 
     
R-squared 0.985517    Mean dependent var 11.77091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961983    S.D. dependent var 1.188192 
S.E. of regression 0.231673    Akaike info criterion 0.174150 
Sum squared resid 0.429380    Schwarz criterion 0.868450 
Log likelihood 12.08435    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.337706 
F-statistic 41.87558    Durbin-Watson stat 3.543317 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000007    
The model had an R-squared of 0.986 indicating that the model was a good fit. However, one 
problem of relying on R-squared as a measure of goodness of fit is that as you add more 
regressors, though some will not be contributing to the explanatory power of the model, R-
squared will keeps on increasing to the extreme case of even obtaining a one. Hence, the 
adjusted R-squared, which was 0.962, is better measure of goodness of fit for the model.  
 
The DW statistic of 3.54 the output, which according to the rule of thumb of 2, shows that 
there was no evidence of a positive serial correlation in the residuals. The F-test is a joint test 
such that even if all the t-statistics are insignificant, the F-statistic can be highly significant. 
The p-value of 0.000007, below the F-statistic, denoted by Prob(F-statistic), which is the 
marginal significance level of the F-test is less than the significance level tested at 0.05, hence 
rejecting the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are equal to zero. From the results 
above, the p-value is fundamentally zero; hence we reject the null hypothesis that all of the 
regression coefficients are zero.  
 
4.7 Granger causality  
The results of the granger causality analysis are presented in Table 10. From the results, the 
following causality relationships were observed.  
 
Table 10: Granger test results 




  EDEBT does not Granger Cause EBAL 3.19987 0.05901* Reject the null hypothesis 
  EBAL does not Granger Cause EDEBT 0.11376 0.95048 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EXCHANGE does not Granger Cause EBAL 0.67476 0.58273 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EBAL does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE 1.18647 0.35312 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  FISC does not Granger Cause EBAL 0.10414 0.95618 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EBAL does not Granger Cause FISC 0.80531 0.51305 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 




  EBAL does not Granger Cause GDP 1.11945 0.377 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause EBAL 0.85841 0.48702 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EBAL does not Granger Cause INFLA 0.20737 0.88947 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  RATINGS does not Granger Cause EBAL 2.45573 0.1094 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EBAL does not Granger Cause RATINGS 0.06184 0.97902 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EXCHANGE does not Granger Cause EDEBT 1.1267 0.37434 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EDEBT does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE 0.35226 0.78827 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  FISC does not Granger Cause EDEBT 1.35606 0.29958 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EDEBT does not Granger Cause FISC 0.62842 0.60944 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  GDP does not Granger Cause EDEBT 0.78882 0.5214 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EDEBT does not Granger Cause GDP 0.80339 0.51401 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause EDEBT 0.07062 0.97464 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EDEBT does not Granger Cause INFLA 0.14874 0.92865 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  RATINGS does not Granger Cause EDEBT 6.65857 0.00581*** Reject the null hypothesis 
  EDEBT does not Granger Cause RATINGS 1.75846 0.20456 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  FISC does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE 1.37829 0.29323 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EXCHANGE does not Granger Cause FISC 0.53397 0.66703 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  GDP does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE 1.2095 0.34529 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EXCHANGE does not Granger Cause GDP 1.35595 0.29961 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE 1.12673 0.37432 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EXCHANGE does not Granger Cause INFLA 2.06807 0.15404 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  RATINGS does not Granger Cause EXCHANG 2.55927 0.10009 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  EXCHANGE does not Granger Cause RATINGS 1.39341 0.289 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FISC 0.32549 0.80696 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  FISC does not Granger Cause GDP 0.66566 0.58789 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause FISC 4.78434 0.0185** Reject the null hypothesis 
  FISC does not Granger Cause INFLA 0.61201 0.61914 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  RATINGS does not Granger Cause FISC 1.15668 0.36353 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  FISC does not Granger Cause RATINGS 2.59346 0.09721 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause GDP 4.86378 0.01754** Reject the null hypothesis 
  GDP does not Granger Cause INFLA 0.28358 0.83637 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  RATINGS does not Granger Cause GDP 1.93236 0.17424 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  GDP does not Granger Cause RATINGS 0.40639 0.75098 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  RATINGS does not Granger Cause INFLA 0.82277 0.50434 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
  INFLA does not Granger Cause RATINGS 0.0682 0.97587 Cannot reject the null hypothesis 
 
Note:***, ** and * denotes rejection of the null hypotheses at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
   
It could be concluded that changes in most of the variables do not have an effect on the 
changes amongst each other, thus do not “granger cause’ each other, therefore cannot reject 




GDP led to changes in external balance, and changes in fiscal balance and exchange rate had 
an impact on changes in ratings. Therefore it can be concluded that servicing of the external 
debt forms a major component of the current account surplus relative to GDP. Also changes 
in ratings affect changes in external debt servicing and exchange rate, hence changes in the 








































The chapter sums the research by summarising the study, bringing forth the conclusions and 
recommendations which may be useful in making sure emerging and developing countries 
achieve quality investment grade ratings. The chapter is concluded by discussions on other 
avenues for future and further study surrounding the subject of sovereign credit ratings. 
 
5.2 Summary of the study 
Certain regulatory requirements necessitating sovereigns and their sub-sovereigns to have 
achieved certain credit ratings shows the importance and need for every emerging country to 
have, not just an assigned sovereign credit rating, but a good one in order to easily access 
funding on the international capital markets. According to Cantor (2006), credit ratings, 
which until this day, are still dominated by the three international ratings agencies namely 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, have become a de-facto requirement in the international borrowing 
community.   
 
Several studies have revealed that a relationship does exist between macroeconomic factors 
and sovereign ratings, which in turn have a subsequent impact on the cost of borrowing, 
(Hooper et al, 2008 and Moora, 2006). However, despite such overwhelming evidence on the 
impact of sovereign credit ratings, most emerging and developing countries still remain 
unrated. The few that have been assigned these ratings still fall short of quality investment 
grades, (Standard and Poor’s, 2015). South Africa was assigned its first sovereign ratings in 
1994 by all three leading ratings agencies, and its ratings have tumbled year on year in the 
past decade. 
 
It is upon such background that the study seeks to investigate the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings in emerging markets using South Africa as a case study. For the purposes of the 
study, the ratings assigned by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are used, together with other six 





1. Long term economic prospects (economic growth and development) do not have a 
marginal effect on sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies. 
2. Stability and flexibility of fiscal and monetary policies have no statistically significant 
effect on sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies. 
3. Long term external debt and sovereign credit history do not have a marginal effect on 
sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies. 
     
5.3 Conclusions 
In the long run, the empirical evidence from the research supports and is in line with the 
findings of Cantor and Parker (1996), that economic development and growth, inflation, 
external debt are the major quantitative drivers and determinants of sovereign credit ratings. It 
also goes on to re-affirm findings by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al (2006), which observed the 
high impact of economic growth and external debt in the quality of ratings assigned to a 
particular country. 
 
The study also supports Mellios et al (2006) on their conclusions that government revenue, 
real exchange rate stability and the inflation rate are factors which drive sovereign credit 
ratings. The statistically non-significance of the variables in the long run also support the 
findings by Gaillard (2009), who argued that in as much as quantitative macroeconomic 
factors significantly determine sovereign credit ratings in the short run; certain qualitative 
factors have a bearing on the ratings in the long term, and such evidence based on the long 
run empirical results is overwhelming. 
 
The empirical evidence further reveals, with respect to the hypotheses tested under the study, 
that long term economic prospects on growth and development, have a marginal effect on 
sovereign credit ratings. Also, that stability and flexibility of both the fiscal and monetary 
policies is key to the determination of credit ratings for countries. The empirical evidence also 
suggests that long term external debt has a great impact on the present sovereign credit risk 
architecture.  
 
In conclusion, the study tested six macroeconomic variables and their impact on sovereign 
credit ratings; and the empirical evidence suggests that these variables, namely GDP, 
inflation, real exchange rate, external balance, external debt and fiscal balance, in the short 




and developing countries by the three leading credit ratings agencies. However, in the long 
run, these quantitative macroeconomic factors, on their own, have no significant impact on 
ratings. 
 
5.4 Recommendations  
Sovereign credit ratings provide the international debt and capital markets with information 
about sovereigns’ investment grades which go beyond what is available on the public domain. 
That information is of great value to the markets in investment decisions and on pricing those 
investments. Therefore, it is imperative that individual countries get quality investment grade 
ratings to better manage the cost of capital for the central governments and all its sub-
sovereign units.  
 
The study recommends that sovereigns maintain clear consistent policies that dictate and 
drive positive macroeconomic fundamentals. As it can be noted from the findings of the study 
that external debt servicing and past ratings have a huge impact on future sovereign credit 
ratings, countries should always avoid defaulting on debt. It would make economic sense, 
from a debt management point to seek restructures before debt default or write-offs.  
 
The fiscal and monetary authorities should always work hand in hand in providing policies 
and measures that in sync. An effective interplay of these two policies will contribute 
immensely to positive ratings. Also to the policy makers, clear efforts should be made in 
growing the economy and the country’s aggregate income. Whilst managing all these other 
issues well, it is imperative for sovereigns to report and retain correct and reliable data which 
can be easily accessible to ratings agencies and investors. Reliable data will enable investors 
to make valuable investment decisions about sovereigns, even in the event of a downgrade or 
non-investment grade credit ratings.  
 
As it can be noted from the research, quantitative factors alone do not guarantee good quality 
ratings, hence countries need to strengthen their democratic processes, institutions and the 
perception displayed to the rest of the world with regards to issues like respecting the rule of 






5.5 Avenues for future research  
In as much as the study attempted to capture all the determinants of sovereign credit ratings in 
emerging countries using South Africa as a case, there is still an opportunity to further 
explore this area of study. The study did not address the impact of ratings agencies’ 
perceptions around political developments, corruption and the strength of legal institutions on 
assigned ratings considering that those factors are quite rampant in emerging and developing 
countries. The future research can make further contributions on the weight of those 
qualitative factors on sovereign credit ratings.  
 
The study also ignored ratings outlook by only focusing on core ratings benchmarks, it would 
also be of great contribution to the research area to incorporate ratings outlook on the overall 
determinants of sovereign credit ratings. 
 
Another avenue of further study will be to investigate the impact of sovereign credit ratings 
on some of the fundamental macroeconomic variables like exchange rates and capital flows. 
There is also overwhelming evidence that suggest that most developing countries still remain 
unrated to this day, an investigation on the impact and reasons as to why most developing 
countries and some emerging markets, despite the clear advantages of sovereign credit 
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Appendix A:  Long term issuer foreign currency credit ratings 
Category Definition 
AAA 
An obligor rated 'AAA' has extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. 'AAA' is the highest issuer credit 
rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings. 
AA 
An obligor rated 'AA' has very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. It differs from the highest-rated obligors 
only to a small degree. 
A 
An obligor rated 'A' has strong capacity to meet its financial commitments but is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse 
effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligors in higher-rated categories. 
BBB 
An obligor rated 'BBB' has adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. However, adverse economic conditions or 
changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitments. 
BB; B; CCC; 
and CC 
Obligors rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', and 'CC' are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least 
degree of speculation and 'CC' the highest. While such obligors will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, 
these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposures to adverse conditions. 
BB 
An obligor rated 'BB' is less vulnerable in the near term than other lower-rated obligors. However, it faces major ongoing 
uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's 
inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
B 
An obligor rated 'B' is more vulnerable than the obligors rated 'BB', but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its 
financial commitments. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or 
willingness to meet its financial commitments. 
CCC 
An obligor rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon favourable business, financial, and economic 
conditions to meet its financial commitments. 
CC 
An obligor rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable. The 'CC' rating is used when a default has not yet occurred, but S&P 
Global Ratings expects default to be a virtual certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to default. 
R 
An obligor rated 'R' is under regulatory supervision owing to its financial condition. During the pendency of the regulatory 
supervision the regulators may have the power to favour one class of obligations over others or pay some obligations and not 
others. 
SD and D 
An obligor rated 'SD' (selective default) or 'D' is in default on one or more of its financial obligations including rated and 
unrated financial obligations but excluding hybrid instruments classified as regulatory capital or in non-payment according to 
terms. An obligor is considered in default unless S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within five 
business days of the due date in the absence of a stated grace period, or within the earlier of the stated grace period or 30 
calendar days. A 'D' rating is assigned when S&P Global Ratings believes that the default will be a general default and that 
the obligor will fail to pay all or substantially all of its obligations as they come due. An 'SD' rating is assigned when S&P 
Global Ratings believes that the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations but it will 
continue to meet its payment obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely manner. An obligor's rating is 
lowered to 'D' or 'SD' if it is conducting a distressed exchange offer. 
NR An issuer designated 'NR' is not rated. 
*The ratings from 'AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing 
within the major rating categories. 




Appendix B: Mapping of Rating Grades  




















1994 BB 9 Baa3 11 BB 9 9.67 
1995 BB 9 Baa3 11 BB 9 9.67 
1996 BB+ 10 Baa3 11 BB+ 10 10.33 
1997 BB+ 10 Baa3 11 BB+ 10 10.33 
1998 BB+ 10 Baa3 11 BB+ 10 10.33 
1999 BB+ 10 Baa3 11 BB+ 10 10.33 
2000 BB+ 10 Baa3 11 BB+ 10 10.33 
2001 BBB- 11 Baa2 12 BBB- 11 11.33 
2002 BBB- 11 Baa2 12 BBB- 11 11.33 
2003 BBB- 11 Baa2 12 BBB- 11 11.33 
2004 BBB 12 Baa2 12 BBB 12 12.00 
2005 BBB 12 Baa1 13 BBB 12 12.33 
2006 BBB+ 13 Baa1 13 BBB+ 13 13.00 
2007 BBB+ 13 Baa1 13 BBB+ 13 13.00 
2008 BBB+ 13 Baa1 13 BBB+ 13 13.00 
2009 BBB+ 13 A3 14 BBB+ 13 13.33 
2010 BBB+ 13 A3 14 BBB+ 13 13.33 
2011 BBB+ 13 A3 14 BBB+ 13 13.33 
2012 BBB+ 13 Baa1 13 BBB+ 13 13.00 
2013 BBB 12 Baa1 13 BBB 12 12.33 
2014 BBB 12 Baa2 12 BBB 12 12.00 
2015 BBB 12 Baa2 12 BBB- 11 11.67 
2016 BBB- 11 Baa2 12 BBB- 11 11.33 
 
















Growth %  
Real Exchange 











1994 9.67 9.368 3.2 3.549 8.8 0.0 -4.30 0 
1995 9.67 9.541 3.1 3.626 8.8 -1.6 -4.20 0 
1996 10.33 11.584 4.3 4.297 7.4 -1.1 -4.10 0 
1997 10.33 17.233 2.6 4.607 8.6 -1.5 -4.50 0 
1998 10.33 12.172 0.5 5.528 7.0 -1.7 -3.50 0 
1999 10.33 12.114 2.4 6.113 5.1 -0.5 -2.40 0 
2000 10.33 9.868 4.2 6.943 5.4 -0.1 -1.90 0 
2001 11.33 11.360 2.7 8.615 5.6 0.3 -1.00 0 
2002 11.33 13.068 3.7 10.502 9.1 0.9 -0.70 0 
2003 11.33 8.357 2.9 7.546 5.9 -0.8 -2.30 0 
2004 12.00 6.337 4.6 6.440 1.4 -2.8 -2.00 0 
2005 12.33 6.417 5.3 6.364 3.4 -3.1 -0.50 0 
2006 13.00 8.680 5.6 6.768 4.6 -4.5 0.20 0 
2007 13.00 4.235 5.4 7.052 7.2 -5.4 1.00 0 
2008 13.00 6.937 3.2 8.273 11.0 -5.5 -1.00 0 
2009 13.33 5.952 -1.5 8.419 7.1 -2.7 -6.30 0 
2010 13.33 5.648 3.0 7.320 4.3 -1.5 -4.70 0 
2011 13.33 4.761 3.3 7.263 5.0 -2.2 -4.70 0 
2012 13.00 7.862 2.2 8.207 5.6 -5.1 -5.00 0 
2013 12.33 10.640 2.2 9.651 5.8 -5.9 -4.40 0 
2014 12.00 6.654 1.5 10.848 6.1 -5.3 -4.30 0 
2015 11.67 7.673 1.3 12.768 4.6 -4.4 -4.10 0 




Appendix D: ARDL Model Results 
 
Dependent Variable: RATINGS   
Method: ARDL    
Date: 11/28/17   Time: 10:06   
Sample (adjusted): 1995 2016   
Included observations: 22 after adjustments  
Maximum dependent lags: 1 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) 
Dynamic regressors (1 lag, automatic): EXCHANGE EDEBT EBAL FISC 
        GDP INFLA     
Fixed regressors: C   
Number of models evalulated: 128  
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
     
     RATINGS(-1) 0.915680 0.175223 5.225808 0.0008 
EXCHANGE -0.005442 0.038445 -0.141552 0.8909 
EDEBT 0.016464 0.030210 0.544974 0.6006 
EDEBT(-1) -0.075864 0.031842 -2.382478 0.0444 
EBAL 0.257590 0.086150 2.990009 0.0173 
EBAL(-1) -0.109292 0.066524 -1.642894 0.1390 
FISC 0.229160 0.109339 2.095855 0.0694 
FISC(-1) -0.135556 0.115292 -1.175764 0.2735 
GDP -0.027774 0.078728 -0.352784 0.7334 
GDP(-1) 0.249550 0.091724 2.720656 0.0262 
INFLA -0.150726 0.042838 -3.518477 0.0079 
INFLA(-1) 0.175460 0.073672 2.381642 0.0444 
C 0.876813 1.970096 0.445061 0.6681 
     
     R-squared 0.985517    Mean dependent var 11.77091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961983    S.D. dependent var 1.188192 
S.E. of regression 0.231673    Akaike info criterion 0.174150 
Sum squared resid 0.429380    Schwarz criterion 0.868450 
Log likelihood 12.08435    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.337706 
F-statistic 41.87558    Durbin-Watson stat 3.543317 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007    
     
     *Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test 
 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(RATINGS)  
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 11/28/17   Time: 10:13   
Sample: 1994 2016   
Included observations: 22   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 0.876813 1.970096 0.445061 0.6681 
RATINGS(-1)* -0.084320 0.175223 -0.481218 0.6432 
EXCHANGE** -0.005442 0.038445 -0.141552 0.8909 
EDEBT(-1) -0.059400 0.045062 -1.318186 0.2239 
EBAL(-1) 0.148299 0.091045 1.628851 0.1420 
FISC(-1) 0.093604 0.121548 0.770096 0.4634 
GDP(-1) 0.221776 0.130861 1.694749 0.1286 
INFLA(-1) 0.024733 0.057212 0.432314 0.6769 
D(EDEBT) 0.016464 0.030210 0.544974 0.6006 
D(EBAL) 0.257590 0.086150 2.990009 0.0173 
D(FISC) 0.229160 0.109339 2.095855 0.0694 
D(GDP) -0.027774 0.078728 -0.352784 0.7334 
D(INFLA) -0.150726 0.042838 -3.518477 0.0079 
     




** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).  
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     EXCHANGE -0.064539 0.460067 -0.140281 0.8919 
EDEBT -0.704455 1.676890 -0.420096 0.6855 
EBAL 1.758754 3.058741 0.574993 0.5811 
FISC 1.110096 1.496033 0.742026 0.4793 
GDP 2.630162 6.305652 0.417112 0.6876 
INFLA 0.293327 0.929110 0.315708 0.7603 
C 10.39860 15.22336 0.683069 0.5139 
     
     EC = RATINGS - (-0.0645*EXCHANGE  -0.7045*EDEBT + 1.7588*EBAL + 
        1.1101*FISC + 2.6302*GDP + 0.2933*INFLA + 10.3986 ) 
     
          
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     
   
Asymptotic: 
n=1000  
F-statistic  5.874338 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
Actual Sample Size 22  
Finite Sample: 
n=35  
  10%   2.196 3.37 
  5%   2.597 3.907 
  1%   3.599 5.23 
     
   
Finite Sample: 
n=30  
  10%   2.277 3.498 
  5%   2.73 4.163 
  1%   3.864 5.694 
     







ARDL Short Run Form and Error Correction Model  
 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(RATINGS)  
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 01/26/18   Time: 20:07   
Sample: 1994 2016   
Included observations: 22   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(INFLA) -0.150726 0.021393 -7.045674 0.0001 
D(GDP) -0.027774 0.029132 -0.953393 0.3683 
D(FISC) 0.229160 0.043647 5.250354 0.0008 
D(EDEBT) 0.016464 0.012647 1.301809 0.2292 
D(EBAL) 0.257590 0.038450 6.699349 0.0002 
CointEq(-1)* -0.084320 0.008200 -10.28290 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.870557    Mean dependent var 0.075455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.830106    S.D. dependent var 0.397441 
S.E. of regression 0.163818    Akaike info criterion -0.553123 
Sum squared resid 0.429380    Schwarz criterion -0.255566 
Log likelihood 12.08435    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.483027 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.543317    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.874338 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     






Appendix E  






ADF Test Statistic -1.933456     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RATINGS) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:30 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
RATINGS(-1) -0.136307 0.070499 -1.933456 0.0691 
D(RATINGS(-1)) 0.215930 0.214679 1.005827 0.3278 
C 0.148196 0.075526 1.962174 0.0654 
R-squared 0.221121     Mean dependent var 0.003276 
Adjusted R-squared 0.134578     S.D. dependent var 0.015349 
S.E. of regression 0.014279     Akaike info criterion -5.528447 
Sum squared resid 0.003670     Schwarz criterion -5.379229 
Log likelihood 61.04869     F-statistic 2.555063 






ADF Test Statistic -4.276301     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(EDEBT,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:34 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(EDEBT(-1)) -1.748046 0.408775 -4.276301 0.0005 
D(EDEBT(-1),2) 0.377223 0.254228 1.483799 0.1562 
C 0.017976 0.698954 0.025718 0.9798 
R-squared 0.632860     Mean dependent var 0.197200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.589667     S.D. dependent var 4.868548 
S.E. of regression 3.118656     Akaike info criterion 5.250162 
Sum squared resid 165.3423     Schwarz criterion 5.399522 
Log likelihood -49.50162     F-statistic 14.65195 





Growth, GDP  
 
ADF Test Statistic -4.679995     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:37 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(GDP(-1)) -1.617283 0.345574 -4.679995 0.0002 
D(GDP(-1),2) 0.362076 0.224150 1.615330 0.1246 
C -0.253745 0.418255 -0.606675 0.5521 
R-squared 0.650841     Mean dependent var -0.110000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.609764     S.D. dependent var 2.986443 
S.E. of regression 1.865598     Akaike info criterion 4.222521 
Sum squared resid 59.16776     Schwarz criterion 4.371881 
Log likelihood -39.22521     F-statistic 15.84422 






ADF Test Statistic -1.464266     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(EXCHANGE) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:48 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
EXCHANGE(-1) -0.138875 0.094843 -1.464266 0.1604 
D(EXCHANGE(-1)) 0.386971 0.214623 1.803027 0.0882 
C 0.137486 0.081251 1.692109 0.1079 
R-squared 0.204409     Mean dependent var 0.028956 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116010     S.D. dependent var 0.059269 
S.E. of regression 0.055725     Akaike info criterion -2.805221 
Sum squared resid 0.055894     Schwarz criterion -2.656003 
Log likelihood 32.45482     F-statistic 2.312350 









ADF Test Statistic -4.491474     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(INFLA,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:49 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(INFLA(-1)) -1.400974 0.311918 -4.491474 0.0003 
D(INFLA(-1),2) 0.419916 0.224705 1.868742 0.0790 
C -0.107711 0.512066 -0.210346 0.8359 
R-squared 0.578826     Mean dependent var 0.155000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.529276     S.D. dependent var 3.318445 
S.E. of regression 2.276762     Akaike info criterion 4.620867 
Sum squared resid 88.12197     Schwarz criterion 4.770226 
Log likelihood -43.20867     F-statistic 11.68170 





ADF Test Statistic -3.409363     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(EBAL,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:50 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(EBAL(-1)) -0.869344 0.254987 -3.409363 0.0033 
D(EBAL(-1),2) 0.391203 0.217611 1.797715 0.0900 
C -0.140609 0.269238 -0.522246 0.6082 
R-squared 0.406944     Mean dependent var 0.030000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.337172     S.D. dependent var 1.446629 
S.E. of regression 1.177762     Akaike info criterion 3.302591 
Sum squared resid 23.58111     Schwarz criterion 3.451950 
Log likelihood -30.02591     F-statistic 5.832534 











ADF Test Statistic -3.564929     1%   Critical Value* -3.8067 
      5%   Critical Value -3.0199 
      10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(FISC,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/16/17   Time: 23:52 
Sample(adjusted): 1997 2016 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(FISC(-1)) -1.141335 0.320156 -3.564929 0.0024 
D(FISC(-1),2) 0.237773 0.235730 1.008664 0.3273 
C 0.009518 0.351281 0.027095 0.9787 
R-squared 0.491268     Mean dependent var 0.005000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.431418     S.D. dependent var 2.083387 
S.E. of regression 1.570965     Akaike info criterion 3.878739 
Sum squared resid 41.95485     Schwarz criterion 4.028099 
Log likelihood -35.78739     F-statistic 8.208218 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.002083     Prob(F-statistic) 0.003200 
 
